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The Impact of Contagion on Non-Performing Loans: 
Evidence from Australia and Canada 
 
D.E. Allen*, R.R. Boffey* and R.J. Powell* 
 
Despite Canadian and Australian banks being widely perceived as having 
weathered the storm of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) very successfully, 
the impaired assets (also known as non-performing loans) of both these two 
countries increased several fold during this crisis.  Previous studies in other 
countries have tended to focus on the impact of bank specific factors, such as 
size and return on equity, in explaining bank risk. Our approach involves 
including those traditional variables, plus Distance to Default (DD), and a 
novel contagion variable, which is the effect of major global bank DD on 
Australian and Canadian non-performing loans. The study incorporates all 
twenty two listed Australian and Canadian Banks and uses a fixed effects  
panel data regression over the period 1999-2008. Robustness checks include 
correlation and VIF analysis as well a two stage least squares model as an 
alternative. We find that bank specific balance sheet and income statement 
factors are not good explanatory variables for bank risk. In contrast, the 
contagion variable is significant in explaining Canadian and Australian bank 
risk, which suggests that prudential regulators should look to specifically 
allocate a portion of regulatory capital to deal with contagion effects. 
 
JEL Codes: G01, G21 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The relative success of Australian and Canadian banks in weathering the Global 
Financial Crisis (GFC) has been noted by a number of commentators. Their earnings, 
capital levels and credit ratings have all been a source of envy for regulators of banks in 
Europe, America and the United Kingdom. The G-20 and the European Union have 
tried to identify the features of the Canadian and Australian financial systems which 
have underpinned this success in order to use them in shaping a revised international 
regulatory framework.  
 
The popular press contains many references to how the two countries are similar (e.g. 
Sales, 2003). Academic research has also identified similarities as well as differences in 
a number of different contexts (e.g. Brooks, 2009; Allen & Powell, 2010; Allen, Boffey, & 
Powell, 2011).  MacMillan & McKenzie (2002) provide a detailed analysis of how the 
various relations between Canada and Australia have changed during the twentieth 
century. They conclude that similarities between the two countries have underpinned 
the cooperation and cordiality that is a feature of the relationship. 
 
Canada and Australia share many similarities but also some differences. Their 
geography involves small populations living mainly in large cities, with large parts of 
each continent being uninhabited and possessing substantial mineral wealth. The 
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Queen of Australia and the Queen of Canada is the same person, which reflects their 
shared British heritage. Differences are found in their locations: one in the northern 
hemisphere close to the USA and the other far away in the southern hemisphere close 
to Asia. 
 
With the occurrence of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), a new area of similarity 
between the two countries has emerged: “the relative resilience of our banking sectors” 
(Stevens, 2009). In this speech, RBA Governor Stevens highlights how Canadian and 
Australian banks lent more conservatively and held only modest amounts of the 
complex securities which have plagued banks in other countries, allowing them to 
emerge from the GFC “… largely free of serious problems” (Stevens, 2009). Other 
authors have reached similar conclusions. Dickinson (2010a, 2010b) identifies a 
number of factors, including the past conservatism of Canadian and Australian 
regulatory requirements regarding capital adequacy; the lack of compromised lending 
standards; and a focus on domestic lending. Ratnovski and Huang (2009) undertake 
similar analysis, but only focus on Canadian banks and their balance sheets. The 
benefit of strong bank regulation in Canada and Australia is a sentiment also echoed by 
Smith (2010). Dickinson notes that both the European Union and the G-20 are looking 
to modify their banking regulations in the light of the Canadian and Australian 
experience. 
 
Despite this promotion of Canada and Australia as exemplars of bank regulation in the 
time of a GFC, however, both countries experienced a sharp increase in impaired 
assets  (as shown in section 2), fivefold for Australia and more than double for Canada. 
The current research question to investigate what factors determined this increase in 
impaired assets, and more specifically whether bank risk in these countries is most 
influenced by bank specific variables or contagion arising from key global markets. 
Potentially, this is important research because it may identify peculiarities of Australian 
and Canadian banks as well as determine the role of contagion in influencing bank risk. 
This study adds to previous studies through incorporation of two novel aspects. Firstly, it 
includes of Distance to Default (DD as measured by the Merton, 1974 structural model) 
of Australian and Canadian Banks an explanatory variable of bank risk. Secondly, it 
investigates the impact of global default risk on Australian and Canadian banks by using 
DD of US and European Banks as a measure of contagion. The study finds that 
contagion is a far more significant determinant of Australian and Canadian bank risk 
than bank specific variables.     
 
The next section of the paper provides background information on the banking industry 
in Australia and Canada, together with a literature survey on determinants of bank risk. 
Section 3 deals with data and methodology. Section 4 covers the findings and 
discussion, with conclusions and implications provided in Section 5. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
2.1  The Banking Industry in Australia and Canada 
 
The Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) regulates all Authorised Deposit-
taking Institutions (ADI’s) in Australia.  As per statistics from APRA (2009) and the RBA 
(2009a), ADI’s comprise  58 banks, 11 building societies, and 129 credit unions.  Of the 
58 banks, 13 are Australian-owned comprising 88 % of total bank assets. The 
remainder are subsidiaries or branches of foreign banks, comprising 12 % of total bank 
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assets. The four major banks (Westpac, ANZ, National Australia Bank, and 
Commonwealth Bank) comprise approximately 75 % of all ADI assets. 
  
The Canadian Bank regulator is the Office of the Canadian Superintendent of Financial 
Institutions (OSFI). Figures provided by the OSFI (2009) show Canada has a total of 78 
banks with assets totalling USD $3 trillion. Twenty two of these are domestic banks, 
with the others being primarily branches of foreign banks. Of the 22 domestic banks, 9 
are public companies listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange. The ‘Big 5’ banks (Royal 
Bank of Canada, Toronto-Dominion Bank, Bank of Nova Scotia, Bank of Montreal, and 
Canadian Imperial Bank) have total assets of USD $2.4 trillion, which is approximately 
80% of the total Canadian domestic banking market. 
  
It is important to examine impaired assets, given this is our dependent variable. Table 1 
shows growth in total and impaired assets. Australian and Canadian banks continue to 
grow total assets over the GFC period. Total assets in Australian banks doubled over 
the 5 years to 2009, a slightly higher growth rate than for Canada. Impaired assets for 
Australia showed a fivefold increase from 2007 - 2009. However, because this is off a 
low base of 0.19%, the peak of 0.95% is very low in comparison to international 
standards. Canadian banks more than doubled their increase in impaired assets from 
0.4% to 0.9%, but off a higher base. In comparison to Australia and Canada, the US 
(Federal Reserve Bank, 2009) and UK (Bank of England, 2009) showed delinquency 
rates more than trebling from 2007 to 2009 from 2.4% to 8.8% and from 2.1% to 6.6% 
respectively.   
 
Table 1: Key Growth and Risk Indicators for Australian Banks 
 
Figures are calculated from RBA Statistics (2009b) for Australian banks and OSFI (2009) for Canadian 
banks. For comparison purposes, all amounts are in USD. 
 
DD is a key explanatory variable in our study. As Equity (capital) ratios are a key 
component to measuring this DD, as discussed in our methodology section, we present 
a summary of the capital ratios for Australia and Canada at 2008, the height of the GFC. 
Tier 1 and total capital ratios for both countries in Table 2 are well above the regulatory 
requirements of 4% and 8% respectively. Total equity ratio (shareholders funds to total 
assets) is substantially lower than the total capital ratio for both countries, in line with 
their high housing loan component which attracts a lower risk weighting than 
Total 
assets 
($bn)
Impaired 
assets (%)
Total 
assets 
($bn)
Impaired 
assets (%)
Mar-2000 989           0.6 1,431        1.1
Mar-2001 1,176        0.6 1,577        1.4
Mar-2002 1,153        0.7 1,651        1.6
Mar-2003 1,216        0.6 1,703        1.6
Mar-2004 1,396        0.4 1,754        1.1
Mar-2005 1,536        0.3 1,877        0.6
Mar-2006 1,764        0.2 2,083        0.5
Mar-2007 2,016        0.2 2,375        0.4
Mar-2008 2,463        0.3 2,727        0.5
Mar-2009 2,694        1.0 3,021        0.9
Australia Canada
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commercial borrowers. The equity ratios for Australian and Canadian banks is 
substantially higher than the ratio of 3.5% we have calculated for European banks, but 
somewhat lower than the 7.1% for the US. 
 
                                         Table 2: Capital and Equity Ratios 2008 
 
 Tier 1 Capital (%) Total Capital (%) Equity Ratio (%) 
Australia 8.4 11.4 6.2 
Canada 11.8 14.5 5.2 
Figures for both countries are taken at quarterly reporting date March 2009, or closest reporting date to it. 
Tier 1 and Total Capital figures are as reported by the banks in accordance with Basel requirements.   
 
Overall, this section shows substantial increases in Australian and Canadian bank 
impaired assets, albeit at modest levels compared to other major global areas. 
 
2.2  Determinants of Bank Risk 
 
Prior studies, in various countries, are mixed in their findings as to determinants of bank 
risk (such as share price volatility and default), with independent variables including a 
variety of balance sheet and profitability items such as size, profitability and equity. 
Several studies have considered diversification of bank income sources (such as 
interest versus non-interest income and loans versus non-loan assets) as a determinant 
of bank risk (for example, Acharya, Hasan, & Saunders, 2006; Allen & Powell, 2010; 
Cornett, Ors, & Tehranian, 2002; De Young & Roland, 2001; Saunders & Walter, 1994; 
Stiroh, 2004; Stiroh, 2006; Stiroh & Rumble, 2006). Other studies find that balance 
sheet and income statement items or ratios provide little explanation of bank risk, and 
that changes in volatility and default are often caused by external shocks or contagion. 
Several studies have considered the contagion aspect using contagion measures such 
as correlation of corporate defaults, credit default swaps, macroeconomic factors and 
Value at Risk (for example, Allen, Powell, Kramadibrata & Singh, 2011; Das, Duffie, 
Kapadia, & Saiata, 2007; Davis & Lo, 2001; Giesecke & Weber, 2004, 2006; Jorion & 
Zhang, 2007; Liao & Chang, 2010; Lonstaff & Rajan, 2008; Rosch & Winterfeldt, 2008). 
There are also some notable studies which look at determinants of bank capital (Gropp 
& Heider, 2009; Kuo, 2003; Ngo, 2008; Rime, 2001) which have some common 
independent variables to those used by the abovementioned studies of determinants of 
bank volatility and default. 
 
3. Methodology 
 
3.1 Data 
 
We include all 13 Australian listed banks and 9 listed Canadian banks. For Australia this 
includes the 4 major banks and 9 smaller / regional banks (88% of total bank assets in 
Australia). In Canada this includes the ‘Big 5’ and 4 smaller banks (over 80% of total 
bank assets in Canada). All data is obtained from Datastream, including 10 years of 
daily equity prices for each bank, together with required balance sheet data for 
calculating DD as described below.  
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3.2  DD Methodology 
 
We measure distance to default (DD) using Merton (1974) structural methodology. The 
firm defaults when asset values fall below debt levels. Moody’s KMV model (Crosbie & 
Bohn, 2003) is based on the Merton model, and is widely used by banks to measure 
DD. Based on the thousands of defaulted firms in their worldwide database, KMV find 
that DD is most accurately measured when debt is taken as short-term liabilities (one 
year and under) plus half the book value of all long term debt outstanding. This is the 
approach used in this study. Using equity returns and the relationship between equity 
and assets, we estimate an initial asset return. Daily log return is calculated and new 
asset values estimated for every day. Following KMV, this is repeated until asset returns 
converge. The standard deviation of these asst returns (σv) is used in the calculation of 
DD as follows: 
 
T
TFV
DD
v
v

 )5.0()/ln( 2

       (1) 
 
Where V is the market value of the firm, F = face value of firm’s debt, and µ = an 
estimate of the annual return (drift) of the firm’s assets. T is usually set as 1 year. 
   
3.3  Multiple Regression 
 
Impaired assets (also known as non-performing loans) is the dependent variable (NPL), 
with separate fixed effects regressions for Australia and Canada. This is confirmed via 
the Hausman test to be the most appropriate option with panel data for each bank for 
each of the 10 years in our dataset (1999 -2008). Drawing on key prior studies identified 
in section 2, as well as including DD and Contagion (explained after the equation), we 
use the following variables: 
 
NPLit =  β1Sizeit  + β2Equityit + β3ROEit + β4LAit + β5CLLit + β6INTIit 
+ β7DDit+ β8Contagionit + αi + εit     (2) 
 
NPL is the percentage of non-performing loans (or impaired assets as described in 
Table 1). Size is the natural logarithm of total balance sheet assets. Equity is total 
balance sheet equity / total balance sheet assets. ROE is net profit before tax / total 
balance sheet equity. LA, CLL and INTI are measures of diversification. LA is total 
balance sheet loans / total balance sheet assets. CLL is commercial loans (as opposed 
to residential) / total loans. INTI is gross interest income / total income. DD is the 
distance to default for each Canadian or Australian bank. Contagion is global DD which 
is the combined DD of Europe and US which we calculate for listed banks in these 
regions in the same way as we calculate it for Australia and Canada per section 3.2. 
Note that we also examined ROA as an alternative to ROE, and Tier 1 Capital ratio as 
an alternative to Equity ratio. We selected ROE and Equity as they provided a slightly 
better fit in term of R2 than the alternate measures, and to avoid multicollinearity we 
excluded the alternate measures. A variety of lags were applied to each of the 
variables, but no lagging of variables significantly improved any of the outcomes and so 
lags are not reported here. 
 
As high pair-wise correlations and Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) are indicators of a 
multicollinearity  threat, we calculate and report on these factors prior to undertaking our 
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regression analysis. In the event of collinear variables being identified, these would 
need to be dropped from the model.  
 
We also undertake a number of variations on the variables in the fixed effects model. 
These serve as a robustness check and can assist in improving the estimation of the 
model. Firstly, given that Contagion is central to our research questions, we estimate 
the fixed effects model both with and without Contagion, to clearly see the impact of this 
variable. Secondly, as fixed effects models can suffer from problems such as 
endogeneity or reverse causality, we also incorporate an instrumental method, two 
stage least squares (2SLS), which can be useful in overcoming such problems and 
serve as an alternative method in helping to test the robustness of the fixed effects 
model. Thirdly, as current year NPL may be affected by previous year NPL, we estimate 
a panel regression model which incorporates a lagged dependent variable (NPL-1) as 
an explanatory variable.  
 
We have 9 Canadian banks and 13 Australian banks over a period of 10 years, which 
does not provide a very high number of observations. Therefore, in addition to 
estimating the model for the individual countries, we pool the data for both countries and 
estimate the combined model. We also report on both R2 and adjusted R2, given that R2 
does not take into account the number of observations and will always increase when 
variables are added. Adjusted R2 does factor in the number of observations, only 
increasing if the new variables improve the model more than mere chance would do, 
and could therefore be a more appropriate indicator in our case, where we are adding 
variables and the number of observations is not that high.   
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4. Findings and Discussion 
 
We commence by showing our VIF and correlation results in table 3. 
 
Table 3: VIF and Correlation 
 
 
The far left column shows Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) which measure the extent of muticollineariaty. 
The  remaining figures show pair-wise correlations between all the explanatory variables. The combined 
figures include both Australia and Canada. 
 
There are no VIF or correlation numbers that would indicate high multicollinearity 
concerns. Whilst there are no fixed rules as to what level of VIF or correlations should 
be excluded, generally VIF>10 or correlations >0.8 would definitely be cause for 
exclusion or investigation. Our numbers are well below this. This is because, as 
mentioned in Section 3.3, we have already excluded measures showing 
multicollinearity. We thus move on to the next step of our analysis which is to estimate 
our fixed effects model both without and with Contagion.  
 
Results are shown in Table 4.The model excluding Contagion does not provide a good 
explanation for NPL with R2 of only 0.306 for Australia (DD being the only significant 
item) and 0.493 for Canada (DD being the most significant item, with lesser significance 
Australia
VIF DD Size Equity  ROE LA CLL INTI Contagion
1.446    DD 1.000
3.061    Size -0.047 1.000
1.637    Equity 0.010 -0.514 1.000
2.437    ROE -0.115 -0.388 0.229 1.000
4.511    LA -0.133 -0.541 0.444 0.198 1.000
4.085    CLL -0.051 0.432 -0.345 -0.138 -0.432 1.000
3.018    INTI -0.150 0.294 -0.419 -0.056 0.121 -0.135 1.000
1.106    Contagion 0.282 -0.007 -0.010 0.049 0.008 -0.049 -0.113 1.000
Canada
VIF DD Size Equity  ROE LA CLL INTI Contagion
2.717    DD 1.000
4.953    Size 0.126 1.000
2.071    Equity 0.050 -0.477 1.000
1.227    ROE 0.228 -0.137 0.207 1.000
4.882    LA -0.128 -0.542 0.469 0.089 1.000
1.452    CLL -0.240 -0.187 0.152 -0.237 0.089 1.000
3.063    INTI -0.340 -0.512 0.414 -0.181 0.592 0.387 1.000
2.791    Contagion 0.477 0.014 -0.080 0.204 -0.057 -0.174 -0.347 1.000
Combined
VIF DD Size Equity  ROE LA CLL INTI Contagion
1.305    DD 1.000
3.144    Size -0.112 1.000
3.611    Equity 0.075 -0.491 1.000
1.142    ROE 0.113 0.147 -0.206 1.000
4.540    LA 0.011 -0.537 0.437 -0.208 1.000
2.211    CLL -0.212 0.397 -0.389 0.174 -0.546 1.000
4.049    INTI -0.199 0.177 -0.475 0.138 0.159 0.012 1.000
1.181    Contagion 0.319 0.000 -0.010 0.125 -0.015 -0.070 -0.156 1.000
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shown for Size and Equity). Adjusted R2 is very low especially for Australia. We note 
that these bank specific variables have slightly more explanatory power for Canada ( 
and Contagion less) as compared to Australia which we attribute to the higher country 
specific NPL experienced by Canada in the earlier years of our data sample. R2 and 
adjusted R2 increase substantially and the two measurements come closer together, 
especially for Australia, when including Contagion. Findings are generally consistent 
with the studies mentioned in section 2.2., which found that balance sheet and income 
statement factors are not a good indicator of bank risk and that external shocks caused 
by global contagion (as measured by global DD in our study) can have a significant 
impact. 
 
Table 4: Risk Determinants 
Excluding Contagion 
 
 
Including Contagion 
 
The table shows regression results with NPL as the dependent variable. The regression includes panel 
data for the ten years 1999 – 2008 with bank fixed effects.  Independent variables are shown in the first 
column, as defined in Section 3.3. */**/*** denote significance at the 90/95/99 percent levels respectively. 
The top half of the table includes bank specific variables only, whereas the bottom half includes 
contagion.  
 
Coefficient      t Coefficient      t Coefficient      t
Size -0.091 -1.282 -0.256 -1.752 * -0.165 -1.887 *
Equity -0.083 -0.258 -19.220 -2.351 ** -1.133 -2.040 **
ROE -0.028 -0.148 -0.199 -1.307 -0.701 -2.070 **
LA -0.580 -1.373 0.199 0.211 0.761 1.546
CLL 0.383 1.251 -0.788 -0.621 -0.361 -0.848
INTI 0.008 0.952 0.199 0.239 1.139 2.843 ***
DD -0.025 -6.382 *** -0.066 -3.968 *** -0.021 -3.611 ***
Constant 2.015 1.988 ** 14.215 4.830 *** 2.589 1.637
R
2 
0.306 0.493 0.483
Adjusted R
2
0.186 0.382 0.407
          Australia        Canada        Combined
Coefficient      t Coefficient      t Coefficient      t
Size -0.053 -1.462 -0.128 -1.166 * -0.029 -0.427
Equity -0.054 -0.324 -16.291 -2.628 ** -0.007 -0.015
ROE -0.079 -0.782 -1.451 -2.422 ** -0.714 -2.774 ***
LA -0.079 -0.782 0.482 0.681 0.893 2.358 **
CLL 0.108 0.675 -1.682 -1.803 * -0.635 -1.934 *
INTI 0.007 0.149 0.002 1.005 -0.583 -0.179
DD -0.004 -1.542 -0.048 -2.583 ** -0.008 -1.565
Constant 2.014 1.988 *** 10.180 4.639 *** 1.462 1.197
Contagion -0.120 -17.300 *** -0.268 -8.490 *** -0.152 -11.530 ***
R
2 
0.815 0.747 0.695
Adjusted R
2
0.780 0.686 0.649
          Australia        Canada        Combined
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To investigate whether the fixed effects model suffers from endogeneity or reverse 
causality, and as a robustness check to our fixed effects model, we included as an 
alternative a two stage least squares instrumental (2SLM) method in our analysis. 
Several studies on banks have treated various risk measures and capital as 
endogenous (Aggarwal & Jacques, 1998; Ngo, 2008; Rime, 2001; Shrieves & Dahl, 
1991) with interdependent relationships existing between these variables as well as 
external shocks impacting on them. In our case, there is a complex relationship 
between DD, global DD (Contagion), NPL and Capital (Equity). External shocks could 
lead to increased risk, causing DD and global DD to reduce and NPL to increase. Banks 
will need to increase regulatory capital to deal with increased risk. Losses as a result of 
these shocks could erode Equity. Equity, in turn, is a component of DD (the distance 
between assets and liabilities per equation 1).  One year lags have commonly been 
used in studies as instrumental variables for capital and risk factors. Relationships have 
also been found between stock market returns and capital (Baker & Wurgler, 2002; 
Ngo, 2008) with stock market returns having been deemed a suitable instrumental 
variable for capital. This is because banks potentially time the market and issue capital 
when returns are highest and costs are lowest. Our instrumental variables thus 
incorporate stock market returns for Equity and one year lags for Equity, DD and 
Contagion (we model various combinations, including one instrumental variable at a 
time as well as different combinations of two and three variables). Stock market returns 
are based on the S&P/ASX200 (Australia) and the S&P/TSX index (Canada). Hausman 
tests finds in favour of the fixed effects model and in the interest of avoiding 
unnecessary over-reporting of rejected results, we have restricted our tables to fixed 
effects.  
 
Because current year NPL may be affected by previous year NPL, we include a re-
estimation of the fixed effects model  by incorporating a one year lagged dependent 
variable (NPL-1) as an explanatory variable. These results are shown in Table 5.   
 
Table 5: Lagged NPL as an explanatory variable 
 
NPL is the dependent variable. The regression includes panel data for the ten years 1999 – 2008 with 
bank and time fixed effects.  Independent variables are shown in the first column, as defined in Section 
3.3. */**/*** denote significance at the 90/95/99 percent levels respectively. The model is the same fixed 
effects model shown in the bottom half of Table 4, with the addition of a one year lagged NPL as an 
explanatory variable. 
Coefficient      t Coefficient      t Coefficient      t
Size -0.058 -2.020 ** -0.228 -2.426 ** -0.060 -0.861
Equity -0.141 -1.145 -15.456 -2.022 ** -0.369 -0.821
ROE -0.126 -1.553 -1.897 -3.679 *** -1.088 -3.857 ***
LA -0.187 -1.239 -1.071 -1.588 0.260 0.683
CLL -0.045 0.404 -0.196 -0.459 0.180 0.503
INTI -0.007 1.240 -1.589 -2.090 ** -0.527 -1.390
DD -0.002 -0.819 -0.044 -2.603 ** -0.015 -2.728 ***
Contagion -0.141 -19.380 *** -0.137 -3.141 *** -0.826 -4.513 ***
NPL-1 0.309 6.760 *** 0.618 4.465 *** 0.467 5.818 ***
Constant 0.022 4.619 *** 6.561 2.749 *** 1.894 1.526
R
2 
0.882 0.819 0.782
Adjusted R
2
0.856 0.774 0.742
          Australia        Canada        Combined
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We see that our lag factor NPL-1 is a significant variable for Australia, Canada, and the 
combined model. It has also raised the goodness of fit quite markedly, with noticeably 
higher R2 and adjusted R2 for both countries and the combined model. This is likely 
because during the pre-GFC period, there were a number of successive years of low 
NPLs for Australia, whereas Canada had four years of high NPLs followed by four 
successive years of low NPLs. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The study has added to prior studies by incorporating the two novel aspects of DD and 
Contagion (global DD) as determinants of bank risk.  Although banks in these two 
countries fared substantially better than their global counterparts during the GFC, both 
regions nonetheless experienced a significant increase in risk as measured by impaired 
assets. For both countries, collective balance sheet and income statement 
characteristics were not found to be a good predictor of bank risk, but global contagion 
was found to be highly significant. At present, Basel regulation focuses primarily on risk-
weighted assets of banks as the main criteria for measuring credit risk for capital 
adequacy purposes. However, the low balance sheet significance and high contagion 
aspect makes it important for regulators and banks in smaller countries such as 
Australia and Canada to factor in potential external shocks as a key component of risk 
measurement and management.  
 
The study is limited to twenty two banks, given that these are the only listed Australian 
and Canadian Banks. There is future scope for widening the study to incorporate other 
smaller areas, such as in Africa, Asia and New Zealand to ascertain the impact of US 
and UK led events on their banks. Expanding the study to include other areas might 
also lead to improved fixed effects estimation due to an increased number of 
observations. 
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